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Abstract
In this comment, I build on Shiffman’s call for the global health community to more deeply investigate 
structural and productive power. I highlight two challenges we must grapple with as social scientists 
carrying out the types of investigation that Shiffman proposes: the politics of  challenging the powerful; and 
the need to investigate types of expertise that have traditionally been thought of as ‘outside’ global health. In 
doing so, I argue that moving forward with the agenda Shiffman sets out requires social scientists interested 
in the global politics of health to be reflexive about our own exercise of structural and productive power 
and the fact that researching global health politics is itself a political undertaking.
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Introduction
Jeremy Shiffman’s recent editorial, ‘Knowledge, moral 
claims and the exercise of power in global health’ (1), raised 
some important and often-overlooked issues. In particular, 
Shiffman sought to draw the attention of the global health 
community to the fact that the exercise of ‘compulsory’ power 
(where, by virtue of their material or financial resources, 
one actor can compel another to do something) is not the 
only form of  power at work in global health. He argued that 
we need to also be alert to the exercise of ‘structural’ and 
‘productive’ forms of power. Shiffman illustrates these forms 
by example:
“In global health we see structural power at work in the 
existence of a cadre of individuals – medical professionals, 
development economists, advocacy experts and others – 
who offer advice to governments of low-income countries 
presumed to be in need of their input. And we see productive 
power at work as they create concepts for thinking about 
health priority-setting, such as the burden of disease, 
treatment cost-effectiveness and the right to receive care”. 
These structural and productive forms of power, often rooted 
in actors’ claims to expertise and moral authority, are, for 
Shiffman, important for understanding how decisions are 
made and how agendas are set within global health [themes 
on which Shiffman has made some important previous 
contributions (2,3)]. I concur wholeheartedly with his 
analysis, and with his conclusion that we ought to interrogate 
the origins and uses of both of these forms of power. In this 
short comment I build on Shiffman’s editorial, highlighting 
two challenges we must grapple with as social scientists 
in carrying out the types of investigation into power that 
he proposes.
First, picking up on Shiffman’s injunction to “investigate how 
epistemic and normative power get exercised in the global 
health field”, I raise some questions around the politics of 
challenging the powerful. How can we begin to define what 
are (and what are not) legitimate forms of power in global 
health? Having done so, how do we approach the politically 
difficult issue of challenging well-intentioned global health 
actors whose exercise of power we believe to be illegitimate? 
And, as researchers, how can we do so in a way which is 
reflexive about our own positionality vis a vis the issues we 
study – including the solidity of our own claims to expertise 
and moral authority? 
Second, in examining the exercise of structural and 
productive power in ‘global health’, how should we define 
the boundaries of relevant knowledge and expertise? Here I 
seek to place global health in a broader context, highlighting 
the fact that we need to pay attention not only to structural 
and productive power ‘within’ what we traditionally see as 
the global health sphere, but also the influence that these 
forms of power from ‘outside’ have in determining global 
health outcomes. In particular, I argue that non-health 
forms of expertise have become increasingly influential, with 
individuals from management consultancy and economics 
– not just from medicine and public health – exercising real 
power in ways that are too seldom scrutinized.
The politics of challenging the powerful
Tony Benn, the recently deceased stalwart of left-wing 
Labour politics in the UK, famously said that we should ask 
powerful people five questions: “what power do you have; 
where did you get it; in whose interests do you exercise it; to 
whom are you accountable; and, how can we get rid of you?” 
Benn went on to warn that  “Anyone who cannot answer 
the last of those questions does not live in a democratic 
system” (4). 
Nobody would, I assume, try to argue that the ‘system’ of 
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global health (if such a thing even exists) is in any way 
democratic. Yet there is (again, I assume) a generally shared 
view that the system should strive for at least some degree of 
legitimacy – for example that it should incorporate effective 
accountability mechanisms, and that it should operate in 
the interests of those whom it is intended to serve. How we 
define ‘in the interests of those whom it is intended to serve’ 
is a deeply political question, going to the heart of the moral 
claims through which exercises of power are often justified. 
As Shiffman points out, ‘humanitarian motives’ are often 
claimed by those operating in the field of global health, 
although we know that there is a much more complex variety 
of motives in play – including such interests as profit and 
national security.
That issue aside, it is worth thinking through the politics 
of challenging the (perhaps well-intentioned) powerful, 
considering what we seek to achieve in doing so, and being 
cognizant of our own position as global health researchers/
advocates. To be clear: I am not arguing that we should shrink 
from pursuing the kind of critical analyses that Shiffman 
suggests. In fact I would argue the reverse – that as researchers 
interested in the global politics of health it is incumbent on us 
to undertake them. What I am saying is that our own actions 
in pursuing this agenda are themselves highly political, and 
can lead to another set of political, moral and ethical choices. 
We need, therefore, to proceed in a way which builds in an 
element of reflexivity about the basis of our own judgments, 
and also about the ways in which our research impacts upon 
the object of our study (5). 
As social scientists we are aware of the challenges posed by 
our own positionality vis-à-vis the issues we research. We 
bring our own personal and disciplinary baggage, our own 
biases and preconceptions. We cannot lay claim to an objective 
‘view from nowhere’ (6). Often we might find our views and 
assumptions shared by others in the same field. It would not, 
for example, be a surprise to find a gathering of global health 
scholars sharing similar ideas about the merits or otherwise of 
Big Tobacco on the one hand, and Médecins sans Frontières 
on the other. But perhaps more frequently we will discover 
differences of opinion – as indeed we find in scholarly debates 
over the roles played by the World Bank or Big Pharma in 
global health. 
Shiffman rightly exhorts us to challenge our assumptions 
about which actors exercise power legitimately and which 
do not, and to more fully investigate the origins and uses of 
power by the whole range of global health actors. That way 
lies a more nuanced account both of those actors themselves, 
and also of the global health ‘system’ as a whole. But on what 
basis can we judge legitimacy in a system which has none 
of the accoutrements of democracy? Is it the case that our 
judgment would merely reproduce our pre-existing political 
convictions about what forms of power are and are not 
legitimate? If so, how can we adjudicate between opposing 
positions in the debate? 
There is another political question for us to answer too: what 
should we do if we find (or believe we find) the illegitimate 
exercise of power? 
To illustrate (although not to satisfactorily answer) these 
questions, let us take an example – a deliberately hard case.
There seems to be general agreement that the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation has become an enormously powerful actor 
in global health (7–9). In part, of course, the Foundation’s 
power comes from the size of its financial resources: spending 
over 3.5 billion US dollars each year across all of its programs 
(10) makes it by any measure a top-tier global health donor. 
Through the allocation of those resources the Foundation has 
the ability to effectively create a priority around those health 
issues it chooses to focus upon. Its significance as a global 
health donor also means that it gets a seat at many of the 
tables at which key decisions are made (the ‘Foundation seat’ 
on the boards of GAVI and the Global Fund, for example, has 
most often been filled by the Gates Foundation) and an entry 
to high-level global discussions. To take one example, in 2011 
Bill Gates was commissioned by French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy to write a report for the leaders of the G8 on Innovation 
with Impact: Financing 21st Century Development (11). 
It would be too simplistic, however, to assume that this 
influence is solely a product of the Foundation’s financial 
might. It also lays claim to a depth of expertise on global 
health and development issues, and also to moral authority. 
Indeed Gates’ decision (like that of Warren Buffet) to 
devote a substantial proportion of his personal fortune to 
tackling global health crises could be seen as the ultimate 
humanitarian gesture.
Do these epistemic and normative claims render the 
Gates Foundation’s exercise of power legitimate? I would 
not expect to find agreement over that question: it would 
depend on the legitimacy criteria that we apply – which in 
turn is intimately related to our own political positions. For 
some ‘input legitimacy’ (which rests upon the participatory 
processes through which decisions are made) is crucial. As 
someone committed to the fundamental importance of 
democratizing decision-making, and with a deep suspicion 
of the power exercised by the super-rich, I would myself be 
in this camp. (I realize, of course, that it would be difficult 
on that basis to argue for the legitimacy of any transnational 
actors). I am aware, however, that others would argue on the 
basis of ‘output legitimacy’ (the effectiveness of an institution’s 
actions in solving the problems it aims to address) that the 
Gates Foundation does operate legitimately1. These two 
approaches, both rooted in a particular set of political ideas, 
lead to diametrically opposed views of the legitimacy of the 
Foundation’s exercise of power. 
My point here is categorically not that we should avoid 
discussing the legitimacy of the Gates Foundation (or any 
other global health actor), but rather that we should recognize 
that this is a political discussion and that our own positions 
in that argument are inherently political. We should not 
attempt to take cover behind some bogus claim to ‘objectivity’ 
or ‘neutrality’.
Furthermore, supposing we did find that the Gates 
Foundation exercises power in an illegitimate manner, what 
would we want to do about it? Would we want to drive Gates 
(and his money) out of global health? Would we want to try 
to find some way to make the Foundation more accountable? 
Or should we just grit our teeth and get on with it, accepting 
some illegitimacy in the system for the greater good of the 
issues we care so much about? How should we decide which 
of these courses of action is ‘best’ for global health? And, 
importantly, what would be our own claim to legitimacy in 
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choosing between those options?
Global health and ‘outside’ expertise
Having grappled with those challenges, how do we determine 
which actors (and, by extension, what kinds of knowledge) 
to investigate? It is striking that in his discussion of expertise 
and power, Shiffman’s examples are all traditional forms of 
health knowledge. He tells us that “actors may claim expertise 
concerning the biomedical causes of a condition, its prevalence, 
broader determinants of health, appropriate policy responses, or 
interventions needed to address or avert illness”.
I would not disagree with any of those examples, but the 
list risks creating the impression that only a specific form of 
expertise – ‘health expertise’ – confers power on actors in 
global health. Contrary to this, it seems clear that other forms 
of ‘outside’ expertise have become increasingly influential in 
global health over the past two decades – not least by virtue 
of the global reach of neoliberal ideology (12). Interestingly, 
this has not been the result of an externally-driven ‘hostile 
takeover’ of global health – quite the reverse: it has often been 
the result of global health actors consciously seeking to bring 
in new forms of knowledge and expertise which are thought 
to offer new approaches (and, in productive power terms, new 
concepts and categorizations).
One example of this phenomenon is what we might call the 
‘McKinsey-ization’ of global health. As in many other sectors 
(and as seen at both the national and international levels), 
a high premium has come to be placed on the skills and 
expertise of management consultants. Thus McKinsey & Co. 
(and some of its competitors) have come to have a significant 
say in how things are done in global health. In part this has 
been a product of the very close relationship that McKinsey 
in particular has with the Gates Foundation (13,14), but 
other global health institutions have also turned to the same 
firms for expert input. Their influence goes far beyond 
what we might think of as merely ‘technocratic’ functions 
(monitoring and evaluation of interventions, for example), to 
include much more strategic (and, I would argue, much more 
political) tasks. Consultants from McKinsey, for example, 
played key roles in the initial design of the Global Fund [Rajat 
Gupta of McKinsey went on to be one of the two private 
sector representatives on the first Global Fund Board (15)], 
as well as in the formulation of the Gates Foundation’s global 
health strategies. Most people working in the global health 
field will have observed the number of former management 
consultants (from McKinsey and other firms) now occupying 
senior posts in major international health institutions. 
Unsurprisingly, these individuals bring with them particular 
skills, knowledge, and forms of expertise. Crucially, these 
‘non-health’ forms of productive power have given them the 
ability to shape the global governance of health in significant 
ways.
A second example would be the extent to which global 
health institutions have valued the expertise of mainstream 
economists, and not just health economists. Jeffrey Sachs is 
probably the most prominent – and indeed one of the most 
influential of all contemporary voices in global health and 
development. Sachs’ personal website trumpets the impact he 
has had:
“Since the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) in 2000, Professor Sachs has been the leading 
academic scholar and practitioner on the MDGs. He 
chaired the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and 
Health (2000-1), which played a pivotal role in scaling 
up the financing of health care and disease control in the 
low-income countries to support MDGs 4, 5, and 6. He 
worked with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2000-1 
to design and launch the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, 
and Malaria. He worked closely with senior officials of the 
administration of George W. Bush to develop the PEPFAR 
program to fight HIV/AIDS, and the PMI to fight malaria. 
On behalf of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, from 2002-
2006 he chaired the UN Millennium Project, which was 
tasked with developing a concrete action plan to achieve the 
MDGs” (16). 
An economist, not someone with expertise in medicine, 
public health, epidemiology, virology, or any of the other 
traditional forms of ‘health knowledge’, Sachs’ position at 
the heart of many of the key global health decision-making 
processes perfectly demonstrates the extent to which ‘outside’ 
expertise can confer power and influence in the global health 
system – and this has not been despite the fact that it is an 
‘outside’ form of expertise, but precisely because of that fact.
The lesson for global health researchers is clear: that we need 
to cast our net widely in defining ‘global health actors’, and 
that we need to be similarly broad in our understanding of 
what types of knowledge and expertise matter in global 
health and alert to the ways in which some types of  knowledge 
may come to have power over others. As Shiffman points 
out, privileging certain kinds of knowledge can confer power 
on particular types of individuals, creating a ‘chicken and egg’ 
problem of determining which comes first: do the experts 
legitimate the knowledge, or vice versa?
Conclusion
Shiffman’s call on the global health research community to 
make more effort to investigate the origins and legitimacy 
of structural and productive power is important and well-
timed. However, I have argued here that taking up this agenda 
challenges us in at least two ways. 
First, it requires us to be explicit about the political nature of 
our analyses and reflexive about our own scholarly activity. 
Researchers in global health politics, just as in any other social 
science field, cannot avoid bringing a wealth (or a burden) of 
preconceptions, prejudices, and political commitments with 
them. Whilst social scientists know this in theory, we are often 
guilty of failing to address it in practice. We (and I include 
myself in this criticism) often fall into the trap of presenting 
our arguments as objective truths. Our disciplines themselves 
are often just as elitist, hierarchical and non-transparent as 
the global health institutions we seek to criticize. Researching 
global health politics, not least when we seek to challenge the 
powerful, is itself a political activity. We should embrace that, 
not shy away from it.
Second, Shiffman’s call challenges us to be broad in our vision 
of ‘global health’ as a field. We need to be alert to the power 
of actors and ideas from outside the traditional health field, 
and to better understand how, why, and with what effects 
particular forms of expertise come to be valued in global 
health politics. Ultimately, global health governance is not 
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an island. It exists in the broader context of a global political 
economy characterized by various kinds of structural and 
productive (not to mention coercive) power. In researching 
how global health priorities and strategies are determined we 
always need to make sure that we do not lose sight of this 
important fact.
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Endnotes
In addition, those who argue for the legitimacy of the Gates Foundation often 
make arguments such as the fact that the Foundation is accountable under U.S. 
Foundation law, and that it exercises a relatively high degree of transparency.
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